



23.3.2008 [385-409]

THE GOOD SELF: TOWARDS THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY AND SOLIDARITY IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF CHARLES TAYLOR

Antonius Subianto B | Parahyangan Catholic University,
Bandung, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Ada jurang antara aktivitas moral dengan identitas personal yang menjadi sumber inotentisitas. Salah satu akarnya adalah etika prosedural yang berpusat pada “apa yang harus dilakukan.” Charles Taylor mengatasinya melalui etika substantif yang berdasar pada konsep fundamental tentang “yang baik” (*the good*). Ia menjelaskan dimensi ontologis dari moralitas dan identitas serta menawarkan etika otentisitas, di mana identitas yang benar dan aktivitas yang baik berkaitan secara ontologis. Inilah konsep etis tentang “the good self”.

Key Words:

•*The good (authentic) self* •*The (constitutive) Good* •*Hypergoods*
•*Moral source* •*Moral topography* •*Orientation* •*Narrative identity* •*Ontological dimensions* •*Moral discrimination* •*The ethics of authenticity*

First of all, let us take an illustration from the New Testament, Luke 19: 1-10, about Zacchaeus to show one of the greatest problems of human being, namely the gap between identity and morality. The name “Zacchaeus” means “pious”. His identity is supposed to be that of a pious person. In fact, he is doing something impious. This “pious” person is functioning as the chief of publicans. This gap makes him uneasy. This does not make him “at home”. He is not living according to his supposed identity. He is then in search of being himself, being true to himself, being in his original identity. He is longing for a morality that is in harmony with his identity. He is looking for the good self whose identity is true and whose activity is good. This is the point where he is looking for the solution: knowing Jesus, seeking the source of the good self to get authenticity in which identity fits activity.

Authenticity is about how the human being supposedly exists. It is our original call as a human that is created by God; an ontological plea of being. Only in authenticity, therefore, can one live out an ideal and appropriate life as human. Only in authenticity is one capable of living out true identity and good activity. Only in authenticity is one able to be both happy and good person.

Authenticity explicitly appears among modern existentialists such as Heidegger and Sartre.¹ For Heidegger, our finitude motivates us to choose authenticity as a mode of being against the dissipation of our resoluteness in daily business. According to Sartre, our contingency moves us to desire authenticity as the human project against the tendency of bad faith. It is Charles Taylor who wishes to positively spell out authenticity in a bold moral sense with ontological accounts.² As Heidegger, Taylor believes that authenticity is a mode of being, but unlike Heidegger, Taylor supposes that an authentic way of life is higher compared to an inauthentic way.³ Like Sartre, Taylor believes that authenticity is the human project within history and relation with others, but unlike Sartre, Taylor thinks that authenticity is possible to be achieved and should even be deliberately chosen.⁴

Taylor sees that the gap between morality and identity is one of the fundamental problems. This is escalated by some other problems in philosophy.

1. Modern moral philosophy has allegedly obscured the link between identity and morality.
2. It deals much with procedural ethics, focusing moral life only on what it is right to do at the expense of neglecting what it is good to be.
3. It sidelines the concept of the good by rejecting and by disdaining it and its ontological accounts.
4. It has nothing to do with moral truth because of its reliance on the reductive scientific phenomenology of the 17th century.
5. It is much influenced by the concept of the modern disengaged subject promoted by rationalism and developed by naturalism.

To overcome the problems, Taylor proposes:

1. There is an essential connection between morality and identity; between the concept of the good and the concept of who we are.
2. Moral philosophy has to deal with the concept of the good by considering what it is good to be over what it is right to do.
3. Morality must consider the good as the moral source that is constitutive to the identity of human being as moral agent.
4. Morality should be grounded on both ontological and anthropological base, refusing modern reductive schools on morality such as formalism and naturalism.
5. Identity should be placed in the framework of moral ideals of being true to one's self towards authenticity.

In *Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity*, Taylor defines the modern identity through reconstructing its genesis while finding some moral sources that are constitutive to (true) identity and he describes how the concept of what it is to be human agent is intertwined with the question of what it is good to be. In *The Ethics of Authenticity*, while writing the ethics of authenticity, he designates how the need for authenticity comes out from the ideal of self-fulfillment projected by the modern individualism from which modern malaises grow. Taylor does all these by integrally answering the questions of “what makes life worth living” in respect to the nature of human being and “what makes our lives meaningful or fulfilling” in respect to the nature of human action.

For Taylor, the ontology of the human is necessary to have an adequate concept about morality. The ontology of self cannot be separated from that of the good. Identity and morality are one. Splitting them up would be disastrous. Many human problems occur because of this division. Taylor

wants to overcome this by offering the ethics of authenticity in which morality and identity are held together. The ethics of authenticity attempts to offer an integrated ethical concept towards authentic self that is considered as the good self whose activity is morally good.

This is an ethical concept of the good self at which Zacchaeus eventually arrives. He transforms his life after having been welcomed by Jesus, the source of goodness. He returns to his own true identity. He is now doing what is fitting to his identity. The nominally pious man now is authentically pious. He redeems his past by returning what he had taken unjustly from others and by giving a half of what he owns to others (the poor).

The Good as Ontological Sources of Morality

Most of modern moral philosophers tend to reduce morality to the guide of action or the list of obligation in which morality mostly deals with the question of what it is right to do. Morality turns out to be a rational procedure to provide moral orders. It becomes more rational, abstract, and formal. It wants to strip any ontological account off moral consideration and deliberation; to take moral issues away from the concept of the self and to get rid of moral worth off the concept of the good. Atomism, rationalism, formalism, naturalism, utilitarianism and moral skepticism in one or another way support procedural ethics and refuse the ontological ground for morality. They are considered reductive modern moral schools and Taylor's antagonists.

While criticizing the reductive modern morality, Taylor tries to investigate and defend ontological dimensions of morality in figuring out the concept of the self as moral agent. The ontological dimension of morality is supposed to be the permanent structures for moral acting and living for all human beings. Morality has constant and universal elements. Frameworks, in which we find moral space and narratives, appear to be the ontological features of morality.

Moral frameworks serve as the moral background on the basis of which people act and react. By these, people choose to have this or that action; to do certain moral conduct rather than some other. A moral framework is a set of values or beliefs or norms or sayings that provides one's orientation and direction to the moral living and acting. The framework ascribes meaning to individuals' lives, bestows answers to daily moral questions, and gives orientation to individuals' conducts. Taylor asserts the necessity of this framework, writing that: "I want to defend the

strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us”.⁵

Unfortunately, Taylor finds that the framework has been swept away from consciousness by the progress of natural science that stimulates the disenchantment and the disengaged rational subject. Since then, people are doing morals without relying on permanent features, but rather on changeable aspects of which the naturalists are in favor or on practical reasoning and rational consideration on which Kantian formalism and utilitarianism rely. Without frameworks, we could get what Taylor called “narcissistic personality disorders”⁶ describing a radical uncertainty about identity and morality. For Taylor, frameworks offer the background assumption to our moral reactions, provide the context in which these moral reactions would make sense, and prove a moral orientation that is essential towards certain identity.

To speak of frameworks is to talk about a certain space around which someone is living and doing morals. Taylor calls this space a moral space within which someone finds his or her way and orientation. The space will provide us “the horizon within which we know where we stand, and what meanings things have for us.”⁷ For Taylor, the self can be validly defined only in terms of moral space. Therefore our identity is a moral identity that will determine what we have to do and what we ought not to do. “Our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us and what is not.”⁸ Our identity is determinative and decisive to define the moral space that in turn gives the self the orientation how it is to be good in the context of the question of what makes our lives meaningful, worthwhile, and full. “What I am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for me.”⁹ The moral space appears as a kind of map escorting us to be a moral subject. Taylor calls it moral topography that orients and determines someone to be a moral agent. Moral topography serves as the ontological framework underlying and supporting one's living and doing. This can be considered as Taylor's transcendental condition of human agent living within a moral framework to pursue a true identity in the orientation to the good.

If we know ourselves well in the relation to the good, then we are moved and motivated by and towards the good. The “towards the good” will encourage us to be someone who is suitable with the good. This means that we are not exhausted in what or who we are now, but we are changing and moving to be someone better. For Taylor, the human condition can never be exhausted in the presence. We are always in the process of changing and becoming.¹⁰ Because of this, we have to question ourselves

not only about where we are right now but also where we are going towards and how we have become. This last point can only be treated in what Taylor calls an “unfolding story” which is none but our own narrative¹¹ which is not optional extra in making sense of our lives but rather essential. We are self-narrators gaining meaning through the historical events.

This narrative is very important because I can understand what I am through understanding what I have become. I can orient my life on basis of the story of what I have become and combined with the story of what I am going to become. This involves also the decision of how I get the future that I understand in the connection to the good. Here I have a sense of myself as what I am not yet towards which I am projecting myself. This is what Alasdair MacIntyre thinks that life is a 'quest'.¹² This quest is undertaken in relation to the concept of the good through scrutinizing the history as narrative. The narratives serve as something that realizes the-would-be-self. They lead and guide people to go to certain strongly qualified goods. In the case of diversity of goods of pluralism of goods, by the help of strong evaluation, the narratives make individuals possible to combine and synthesize them into a set of favorable goods and even to change the narratives. This means that narrative must not be only linear. It can be a narrative of change, shift, turn, and twist.¹³

Strong evaluation functions as an articulation of what the subject experiences in certain moral space. It improves the awareness of identity in conjunction with moral orientation. It articulates the narratives that the subject is unfolding towards identity in the direction to the good. In short, it is the articulation of framework as the ontological dimension of one's morality.

Strong evaluation applies a language of qualitative contrast. Someone can give arguments why he or she is doing this or that by showing contrastively the choice among other possible alternatives. His or her choice of action is based on the judgment taken distinctively according to the values of worthiness and dignity. Hence, the strong evaluation articulates “the different possible modes of being of the agent”.¹⁴ It articulates who I am in term of moral sense. This takes us to the centre of our existence as a self; a moral agent. It articulates the quality of life, the kind of being we were, we are, we are going to be.

To articulate moral values means to make the frameworks clearer and to get them more reasonable. The articulation of moral values is possible if strong evaluation functions well. By the help of strongly qualitative language, moral values become more articulated. Articulation can also be considered as a way of unfolding the narratives through which moral

concerns become obvious and more articulated.

Taylor contends that we are bound up with our sense of moral sources. What actually is the so-called moral source? This is about the localization from which one stems his moral situation. Something fundamental to our moral deliberation has already existed surrounding us before we come to realize it. It is the fundamental root that is determining the life of individual. It is the base from which the individual behaves certain morality and from which someone deliberates moral conception and action.

This foundation, moral source so to speak, serves us to get a certain conception about our self and our moral situation. Moral source can be found within or without the self. It is from within the self if moral source is situated in the self such as the voice of nature promoted by Rousseau. It is from without if moral source is located out there such as the Idea of Platonic Good.

For Taylor, moral source is the term indicating the background based on which we are pushed to do morals and to realize the life goods. "A 'life good' is a property which makes a life worthy or valuable."¹⁵ It is "what actions, modes of being, virtues really define a good life for us."¹⁶ It is a feature of human life that is intrinsically worthy. It is also the term of art for constitutive goods empowering people to conduct their lives according to the Good.¹⁷ Constitutive goods are the features that make life goods worthy of desire, want, and wish. They are "features of ourselves or the world or God such that their being what they are is essential to the life goods being good."¹⁸ They provide the constituting ground and generative power for the evaluation of something as good and worthy. They are decisive to one's way of thinking and doing.

Taylor is convinced that we live in the world that is full of goods. There are so many values that are important. People take some certain goods and consider them as necessary for their lives while they put aside some other goods and regard them as secondary. In other words, they rank the goods. One is important than the others. Even for Taylor, in some cases, this ranking makes one of the goods a supreme importance and an incomparable significance.¹⁹ By this, Taylor put forward an idea about hypergoods as "goods which are not only incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about."²⁰ The (hyper) goods evoke and even determine people's lives. The goods have been the frameworks for and the source of their morality.

If people have a strong commitment to such an incomparable good, they will pour all the energy for realizing that good regardless of the cost of

whatsoever they must pay. They do this because this good is so essential to their existence and gives the life meaningful and fulfilling. Here the good is regarded constitutive of and it defines their identity.

In Plato's idea the good is constitutive. It is the criterion of actions designated good. The actions would be good if and only if they are taken based on the Idea of the Good. The good becomes a motivation, drive, and even a constitution for doing something good.

The good actions, conducts, feelings and lives are called life goods because they partake in the feature of "good" in which the Good constitutes all things that are good. This Good commands our love and allegiance to certain moral conduct in which the Good serves as the ultimate source, directing someone to be a good person.

The concept of the constitutive good shows us that morality is not actually about following a list of compulsory dealings or about doing a series of obligatory actions. It is, instead, about realizing the (constitutive) good concretely based on the vision of the good and the love of the good while the good itself stands as the source of motivated actions. The articulation of the good is a way of making contact with the Good. When we lose contact with the Good, it is impossible that we still substantially do moral conduct. If we have no contact with the Good, then, Taylor asserts that: "we would cease to be human."²¹

Articulating the Good is not only doing something good, but loving the Good as well that in turn presupposes knowing the Good. Knowing, loving, and doing the Good are the features of articulating the good. These features cannot be separated from each other, rendering the process of internalization and externalization of the Good.

The articulation of moral values through strong evaluation becomes an ontological impetus for the self to get identity on the basis of the ontological source that is the constitutive good. To articulate moral source nonetheless requires the identification of the Good (constitutive good) that in turn invites us to love the good things. Taylor concludes that: "To love the constitutive good (however conceived) is to be strongly motivated in just that way which is defined as part of doing the good (on that conception). That is why being good involves loving something and not just doing something."²² That is how the constitutive good provides us the ontological source of being moral in the way to reach self-identity; to be a person; to become a good self.

The Self as Ontological Structure of Identity

The constitutive good that serves as moral source establishes moral actions in a way of defining certain identity by the help of strong evaluation and articulation of what it is good. The Good guides and leads someone to do morals in direction towards and in realization of true identity. Identity, however, cannot be comprehended aptly without ruminating appropriately the nature of the self.

Self is an ontological attribute to a proper human individual. Not all agents are a self in that sense. Only human agents have that kind of entity. What is human agency or what is to be a person? Taylor says that “a person is an agent who has a sense of self, of him/her own life, who can evaluate it and make choices about it.”²³ A self is intrinsically connected to morality as Taylor writes that “a person is a being with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights.”²⁴ In order to be attributed a person, someone should have capacity of having self-awareness, a sense of morality, and a sense of historicity, making choice, taking decision, and of projecting something including his life.

This supposes that human agent is a self-determining subject with the sense of responsiveness. The human agents should have consciousness and matterness. By consciousness, a human agent is mindful of meaning and purpose. By matterness, a human agent is capable of determining something as significant. Something matters to us if it is significant. Something is significant because it has value. It is worthy. When we apply both consciousness and matterness to agents, we treat the agents as person having the self. These two elements are constitutive of human agents. This supposes the capacity of making evaluation, self-reflection, and responsibility.

Taylor does not discuss ontological features of human agency in an elaborate writing. However, we can compile the ontological dimensions of human agency from a number of his writings. For instance, Ruth Abbey compiles these ontological dimensions of selfhood into three features: self-interpretation, purposes, and dialogical selves.²⁵ Inspired by Abbey, we are going to show five features that seem to be Taylor's ontology about human agency. They are self-interpreting animal, purposeful agent, language animal, dialogical animal, and embodied subject.

The concept of self-interpreting animal is connected to Taylor's interest in hermeneutics. Taylor expounds the idea of human agent as self-interpreting animal in five claims.²⁶ First, some of our emotions involve our judgment about the world we are connected with and the situation we are in.

These involve values that are important to our desire or purposes or aspiration, or feeling because these give us a description of who we really are and what we actually are. Based on this, we take a kind of relevant decision that Taylor calls import as our sense of situation. Second, some of these imports are subject-referring. The imports have meaning only and if only they are necessarily bound up with the life of the subject. They have reference to the dignity and worthiness of the subject. Third, our subject-referring feelings are the basis of our understanding of what it is to be human and what matters to us as human subjects. These feelings are constitutive to the way of living, the quality of being, the kind of self we are. Fourth, these feelings are constituted by the articulation through the process of having qualitative contrast of our motivation as higher or lower and good or bad. This good or bad is nothing except if it refers to the state of being of the subject. This good or bad ranking renders the subject a kind of moral map based on which the subject acts and reacts. Fifth, these articulations require language. The language gives and articulates certain characteristic to the subject-referring emotions. The language is essential to the proper emotions, affirming who we are in the sense of we are as a human agent.

Self-interpreting animal is reasonable if the human being is also language animal. First, Taylor traces the term language animal from Aristotle 'zôon logon ekhôn' meaning "animal possessing logos" and entailing that the human being is societal being. Second, he treats language in expressive and constitutive view rather than designative. As expression, in and through language, we make things more explicit to consciousness; we create a public space of knowledge and community of humans; we articulate our humanity that is essentially distinctive from other animals. As constitution, in and through language, we express something from our depth as a certain person; we disclose something to be plainer, clearer, and more distinct in regard to the expression of who we are; we articulate and describe ourselves as what kind of person we actually are. In short, Taylor thinks that language is not only expressive but also constitutive of our humanity as he writes that: "Languages realize man's humanity."²⁷

Taylor puts forward "dialogical animal" as ontological feature of the self especially when he insists in the concept of man as interpreting self, linguistic animal, and purposeful agent. To understand fully our ontological human existence, Taylor insists that we have to take into account the crucial feature of human life that is fundamentally a "dialogical character".²⁸ The identity of individual is accomplished within the social relation. It requires what Taylor calls a social matrix²⁹ or a web of interlocutor.³⁰ I feel myself as a

human being because I find myself in midst of others, particularly among significant others. The presence of the significant others makes me human and helps me have a certain identity as a unique individual. Therefore, somebody cannot be a self on his own as Taylor writes that "I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutor: in one way in relation to those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition."³¹

Another ontological dimension of the self is purposeful subject. This is considered in conjunction with the reality that the human being is enclosed by meanings.³² Meanings are ontologically connected to purpose. It is impossible to have meaning without any purpose. Even the purpose somehow determines the way to act, the style to live, the mode to speak, and the life in general in order to get life meaningful and to make sense of our existence. The purpose makes something have meaning for us. We cannot speak about human agent as a self-interpreting animal without supposing that human agent is also a purposeful being. Purpose presents to us as something preceding our practical behaviour and theoretical concept. It penetrates and then structures our concrete activity. Thence, human action is not just an action as such. It always connects to meaning and purpose based on which the human being defines his identity.

All four ontological dimensions of the self would be possible if and only if the human being is bodily entity. Related to epistemology and hermeneutics, Taylor believes that we have knowledge and self-interpretation because we have body. For Taylor, the body is not only essential but also substantial. It is essential because body is an absolute entity without which the human being cannot be known and cannot know anything. It is substantial because body makes the human being come to existence and because of it the human being can have different perspectives and facets of life. Taylor treats human knowledge as something ontologically related to body. Knowledge is gained not through contemplation but rather via experience we have through the body. Abbey supposes that knowledge is "our active, involved coping with the world."³³ Therefore, our knowledge and experience are constituted, established, and modified by "our sense of ourselves as embodied agents."³⁴

The ontological features of human agency as self-interpreting animal, linguistic animal, dialogical animal, purposeful agent, and embodied agent need to be completed by supposing that human agency is always in moral space.

Ontological features of the self convert into the core of human existence, which in various way people call dignity. Dignity is an essential concept that conditions agent as being human agent. Therefore in search

for identity, we have to comprehend well the features building up the so-called dignity. Understanding the concept of human dignity is a way to formulate human identity. Taylor puts the search for identity in the context of what is to be a human agent, in relevance to ontological features that are complimentary to each other establishing dignity. This is also a way to look for an authentic self.

Dignity is all about the what-ness of a being with a self whose ontological features grow and live according to their nature. Someone can be considered with dignity of human being if and only if his ontological features are lived out appropriately towards perfection. An individual can be taken into account as having dignity if he or she can live out the capacity to have self-interpretation, to use language, to make dialogue, to realize purposes, and to present the body with certain moral topography. This is actually what the self all about. This self is an ontological structure of identity. Without understanding the self, we would not arrive at the proper concept of identity. Related to identity, Taylor is convinced that “there is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's life. But this notion gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for me.”³⁵

Ontological dimensions of the self constitute my true identity as human being with dignity. I am a subject who is capable of interpreting my life in my own way according to the fundamental purpose I have been reflecting with myself and communicating with others. The purpose can be my own purpose either related to myself or in relation to others, particularly significant others. I try to fulfill my purpose and achieve my goal by communicating it in a certain language. I cannot obtain the goal of my purpose in a solitary way because I am not a solitude being. I am ontologically a dialogical animal. I exist because of others. I become myself and I know as I am via others because I appear only in my own body that is also a part of my identity along with my other ontological dimensions. My embodiment makes possible the knowledge about others and myself. Without this embodiment, I cannot know others and myself. Only through the embodiment, I have self-knowledge; I can value others and myself. Through the embodiment, I actualize my purpose and I do self-interpretation and make relationship with others. All these show us how, through ontological features, we shape ourselves; we define the self; we formulate the identity.

Identity is only reasonable if and only if it is treated in the context of human agent as a moral subject. Moral self then serves as the fundamental

structure of identity. It is an ontological structure of identity. Taylor asserts that: “being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues, to do with identity and how one ought to be. It is being able to find one's stand point in this space, being able to occupy, to be a perspective in it.”³⁶

As the self is intrinsically linked to moral topography, the definition of the identity of the self then is presupposed by the moral reference that in turn constitutes a central moral question within the self guiding to certain identity. The self has a certain identity that is shaped by the strength and power springing from moral sources. This is the reason that moral topography has a crucial role in defining identity, and consequently forming activity. Thence our identity is always moral one. Identity is not something given or taken for granted. It has to be acquired. It is something we have to formulate and live out in certain culture. We are self-sharper, concludes Taylor.³⁷

The Need for Self-Fullfilment towards the Ethics of Authenticity

Taylor believes that to understand well the core of our identity that can be found by comprehending the ontology of the self, we have to dig up the history. In exploring history, we arrive in the comprehension of what the human being has done. This also tells us about how people are concerned with morality. The concept of morality is found there in history. This history necessarily shapes identity. Hence to understand the modern identity, Taylor reconstructs modern history with its features. One of the outstanding issues is authenticity.

Taylor notices that there is tremendous progress while at the same time there is also enormous regress in our contemporary society and culture. The decline doesn't come out within this contemporary time, but it has been initiated since the seventeenth century.³⁸ Taylor observes at least there are three things causing the decline. He calls the three “the malaises of modernity”, i.e., individualism, the primacy of instrumental reason, and soft despotism.

Today individualism seems to be considered as the great achievement of human history. People enjoy freedom to do whatever they think the best, to choose and express what they like and love to do. They rejoice liberation to live independently of external factors and powers. They discredit the sacred orders accordingly. Taylor calls it the disenchantment of the world with which, “things lost some of their magic”³⁹ and in which they experience “a loss of a sense of any moral or spiritual value”⁴⁰ and “the dissipation of our sense of the cosmos as a meaningful order”.⁴¹ Because of

this, people lose the sense of heroic dimension and the sensitivity to a higher purpose. No meaningful horizon still has place. There is no sense of self-sacrifice or compassion or agape. The celebrated individualism has to be paid costly by the loss of meaning. This malaise also appears in three formulations, namely “permissive society”, “me generation”, and “narcissism”.

Taylor formulates instrumental reason as “the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end.”⁴² Life then is taken into account on economical calculation. Life is narrowed to be a part of economical process. The success of life is determined by economical criteria. This is also a kind of economization of human being. The measure of success of instrumental reason then, for Taylor, is “maximum efficiency, the best cost-output ratio.”⁴³ Taylor sees the alienated situation of human being from his humanness is a description of the human situation that is helpless before the tremendous technological improvement. The role of mind as the faculty of reasoning is increasing, while the function of heart as the faculty of feeling is decreasing. Many previous things belonging to the business of heart are altered and turn to be that of mind. All possible things are to be rationalized under the head. Taylor sees the result of the tendency of instrumental reason is the eclipse of ends.

Individualism and the primacy of reason bring forth the third malaise. There appears a powerful force before which individual and society seem to be powerless. Human life becomes dependent of technological equipment. In most of the time, people cannot be detached from technology. They cannot control what they have produced. People enjoy their lives by using technology instead of socializing with others. Technology replaces the social need to see other human beings. Therefore many people prefer staying at home and enjoying any technological product to involving in social engagement. They enjoy private life in their private “castle” rather than go to public life in “polis” to socialize with others. They enclose themselves in their own hearts. This is exactly what Taylor calls “modern form of despotism, which Tocqueville calls 'soft' despotism.”⁴⁴ This is another kind of slavery. People want to liberate themselves by using highly sophisticated technology, but then they put themselves under the tyranny of technology. The result of this soft despotism is the loss of freedom. The individual feels powerless among huge bureaucratic system, sophisticated technology, and anonymous atomist society.

The ideal of authenticity appears to be a way to overcome modern malaises. Taylor traces the ideal from the spirit of self-fulfillment as the

need for being true to oneself.⁴⁵ The call for self-fulfillment gives people energy to move and to do. The call is a moral ideal, that is, “a picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be.”⁴⁶ Unfortunately the need for authenticity has been pressed down and can easily slide into inauthentic forms such as the culture of narcissism. Moral relativism, moral subjectivism, and rational economic calculation have obscured the need for authenticity and reduced it to a mere individualistic ambition for self-fulfillment. Then Taylor calls us on the need to take seriously authenticity as a moral ideal. Taylor asks us to believe three things.⁴⁷ First, the ideal of authenticity is valid and alive behind or at the ground of various form of individualism. Second, the reasons for the urgency of authenticity in regard with subjectivism are popular and yet rejected as a kind of egoism. Third, there is a possible change to live authentically in a certain society unlike modern culture, system, and society that imprison us in spite of the benefit and achievement.

If the need for authenticity is a valid ideal, then the ethics of authenticity is necessary. For Taylor, this kind of ethics is peculiar to modern culture and just born at the end of the eighteenth century. This ethics is developed based on the earlier forms of individualism: Descartes' rationalism as the disengaged subject, Locke's punctual self as the responsible determining self, Hutcheson's moral sentiment as the voice within, Rousseau's *le sentiment de l'existence*” as the joyful situation in which the self has contact with itself as following the voice of nature, and Herder's call for original way of being. All these forms in one or another way reveal the need to be true to one's self. This is a call to authenticity as Taylor writes: “I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me.”⁴⁸

After having given a sketch of the origins of authenticity, we look into moral sources from which the need for authenticity could spring out. Taylor elaborates moral sources at length in *Source of the Self*. He goes from Plato to Augustine, Descartes and to Locke. Taylor wanders so long to explain the need for authenticity through historically constructing three major modern moral sources: inwardness, the affirmation of ordinary life, and the voice of nature.

For Taylor, Plato thinks about external moral source. The Idea of the Good is taken into account as the source of which the self tunes itself to the Idea by the help of reason in order to be good. For Augustine, the source of the good is not found out there. It is found in the inner self through radical

reflexivity. This is what Taylor grasps as a call towards inwardness. Augustine takes God as the source of the good. Descartes secularizes Augustine's moral source. He puts the subject, *res cognitans*, as the source of truth. He radicalizes the within moral source. The liberating power to act is found in the disengaged self that relies only on reason. Later on John Locke takes a radical stance from Descartes by promoting what Taylor calls "punctual self".⁴⁹ This is a self-remaking that is fully responsible for what it has to do and the good it determines. Moral source is found within the self in a radical disengagement of the customs. The punctual self is freely doing moral by functioning rational control. The sense of dignity comes out from this kind of rational procedure.

Reason as the moral source disappears along with the glorification of ordinary life. The dignity is now found in ordinary life that had been looked down on since Aristotle who treats ordinary life only as a means. The inferior status of ordinary life is precipitated by the rise of the aristocratic ethic of honor, the ethic of generosity, the ideal of 'cortisie', and the ethic of glory and fame. Ordinary life becomes a source of goodness when science is taken to be beneficial to ordinary life. The affirmation of ordinary life is enhanced by Protestantism which believes that ordinary lay people is equal to the religious people and Puritan spirituality which puts the prime wisdom in daily life. There are historical developments, from seventeenth to nineteenth century, that elevate further the affirmation of ordinary life:⁵⁰ the rise of new evaluation of commercial life within the ethical outlook of bourgeois stressing the good production, peaceful and ordered life, while demising the ethical outlook of fame and glory; the rise of a new type of novel, demising the classical outlook of ontic logos and cosmic order; the revolution of Anglo-Saxon and France family life, valuing individual independency of social control, intimate personal relationship, privacy for family life. Related to this, Taylor sees the value of feeling, affection, sentiment, and love become a crucial part of the worthiness and significance of life and human fulfillment.

The above developments incite the importance of nature. People experience the sublime, the real human, and the ultimate reality within nature. Rousseau takes the voice of nature as the moral source. Nature is always right and it comes up to the human being as the first source to stimulate human beings to do something good. He supposes that nature is connected to conscience, a voice within. This voice speaks to everyone. We have to open ourselves to the voice of nature because nature is "a reservoir of the good, of innocent desire or benevolence and love of the good."⁵¹ The voice of nature as the source of individuation and its manifestation

becomes the key to understand identity. This is a new ethics of nature.

By exploring the history and its moral sources, Taylor hopes that we can cast the whole complex that he calls the modern identity.⁵² By understanding the way to the modern identity, we are expected to notice a way towards self-affirmation that becomes distinctive in the discourse of the three moral sources. The way to self-affirmation is somehow an appeal to pursue authenticity and to establish its ethics. This involves the need for redefining the concept of the self and the good and then for synthesizing them. In effect, reformulating identity (the self), morality (the good), and its relationship is indispensable. This brings us to the issue of self-affirmation of the good, leading us to the concept of the good self that is an authentic self and involving a kind of ethics, that is, the ethics of authenticity.

The ethics of authenticity is the moral picture of the true self through finding the design of my life. It is about the moral ideal of the true self, committing to the good and doing the good action. It is all about the good self: the self orienting itself to the realization of the good towards the identity within which the self is true to itself. Here the self realizes itself as having ontological dimension and lives them out properly by attaching itself to the good that in turn becomes the moral source (the Good), empowering itself to be true to its own self in harmony with the projected identity through articulating values and unfolding the whole narratives of life.

Taylor thinks the ethics of authenticity in theistic perspective. By the help of Augustine's concept of radical reflexivity, we are going back to ourselves in order to find God who in turn empowers us to conduct life within the values we strongly value according to the good we find in God. Framed and based on this values we nourish and perfect our ontological dimensions of the self towards identity by articulating all significant things and by unfolding all narrative as the whole story of our lives within moral space. Therefore, for Taylor, God is the constitutive good. God is the Good empowering us to do the good and to be good. He is the moral source of the good self.

In exercising the ethics of authenticity, we involve an honest praxis coming from the depth of the true self, in which God is found as the moral source, towards certain identity we are going to be in the future and based on which we are living out the life goods and without which we will question ourselves what kind of person we are. Then it is clear now that the ethics of authenticity synthesizes morality and identity, a way of conducting good life and a way of expressing true self, the good and the self. The ethics of authenticity wants to promote the concept of the good self. To be good is

to conduct life based on certain moral source giving the framework to manifest strong evaluation in the way to establish certain identity. To be a self is to be close to itself honestly and to express its depth by facilitating all ontological features in appropriate way. To be a good self is to manifest and express a true self based on the constitutive good we are very sure about after having identified our own source of goodness in order to arrive at certain identity we desire to be.

Towards the Ethics of Solidarity

Taylor's morality is that of being organized around the concept of the good involving strong evaluation with the language of qualitative contrast. This is a characteristic of substantive ethics that strives for the end of life and for what constitutes a good life. Taylor emphasizes the substantive ethics on rejecting the procedural ethics of modern philosophy that deals with morality in the formal perspective. He develops the concept of the good as moral source. This good is constitutive to morality. This constitutive good serves as the ontological dimension of morality. This is the way that Taylor puts forwards the idea about ontological features of morality that are believed to be the permanent and yet real features of the moral life of all human beings.

Taylor holds pluralistic morality, believing that there are many sources of morality from which moral beliefs spring, based on which cultural preferences initiate, and from which political conceptions are developed. Even though Taylor nourishes pluralistic perspective in looking at the goods, he claims that only theism can have an adequate moral source. Even as a committed Catholic, Taylor clearly offers Christian God as the adequate moral source.⁵³ Taylor is actually convinced that God is to be the constitutive good guiding and escorting us to the good self. When Taylor talks about inner voice of nature as one of the moral sources. He seems to equalize this voice with conscience as he discusses the significant place of conscience in Rousseau. However, He doesn't explicitly define the inner voice of nature as conscience. This occurs because Taylor seems to integrate Augustine's radical reflexivity with Rousseau's inner voice. By doing this, Taylor gives a central role to God as the moral source, speaking in and through inner voice to bring the self to be true to his own. In expounding this, Taylor more occupies with God rather than with conscience. It could also happen because Taylor wants to keep both the internal good within the self and the transcendental good found in God.⁵⁴

For Taylor, to talk about the concept of identity in modern sense is quite new. Identity is pivotal in the history of modern thought in which the understanding of what it is to be human plays a central role in shaping up the modern identity. For him, the understanding of what it is to be human can be categorized in two perspectives.⁵⁵ The first is historical views that are understood as the changeable features of the understanding of human beings. Because of that, Taylor's identity can also be considered as a historical constructed self especially when he is dealing with the modern identity. The second is ontological views that are comprehended as the permanent features that remain forever and generally can be found in all human beings. These two perspectives shows that Taylorian self is neither a rigid nor protean self. This means that there is always possibility for the self to change the identity because the encounter with others offers a set of values that is formative to an identity the self is seeking for. The meeting with others can be a means to become a more self, to be a true self. Historical dimensions of identity are variable, but ontological features of identity are durable.

The ethics of authenticity is Taylor's answer to the fundamental need of people asking for self-fulfillment. The modern self-fulfillment can easily slide to culture of narcissism in which the self does not find its authenticity but rather self-closeness. To avoid this, Taylor distinguishes the manner from the content of the ethics of authenticity. The manner is absolutely self-center and the content is necessarily self-beyond. Taylor is convinced that the ethics of authenticity as the ethics of being true to own self is the best ethical concept. This ethics assumes that someone who has a self relates his or her self to a certain moral sources empowering him or her to live out the narratives of life towards the good in order to define his or her own true identity without which he or she would cease to be human. Taylor seems to give much emphasis on authenticity rather than on solidarity even though he never excludes solidarity. Therefore, the ethics of authenticity should be considered a threshold towards the ethics of solidarity.

The ethics of solidarity is that of wholeness and oneness of human beings. It allows mutual commitment with reciprocal agreement and support to save humanity by establishing the harmony of interests and purposes through solid responsibilities and warm sympathies among individuals. True responsibility cannot be done unless by developing the sense of otherness. We open ourselves to others in order to accept others as they are. In doing so, we can warmly welcome others into our lives. In order to be responsive to the need of others, we need to have sympathy and empathy. The life of others now becomes partly our life. Sympathy and

empathy can be developed to be more a mature and profound feature, that is, love. This makes us possible to have the spirit of hero, martyr, and saint. Self-sacrifice is only possible when we have love giving birth to compassion. Love is the true energy to perform the ethics of solidarity in an optimal way. The sacrifice is the logical consequence of love. Sacrifice without love will be far away from its true essence. Love without sacrifice will lose its true meaning.

The ethics of solidarity has a potential vulnerability if it is done without having had the ethics of authenticity. This is what tendentiously done by social ethicists. It can go astray from its ideals. It can fall into a kind of self-hidden projection in particular when it is not done completely. It can be an expression of the self hidden agenda through which one proceed one's own plan and project to aim at what is still hidden to public or even still unclear and unknown to oneself. Solidarity that is practiced by an unauthentic self can be even brutal in the way of how it is executed. The ethics of authenticity should accompany that of solidarity. The ethics of authenticity even becomes a kind of prerequisite for that of solidarity. Without having had the ethics of authenticity, it would be questioned to have the true ethics of solidarity. Even the ethics of solidarity can be understood as the prolongation of the ethics of authenticity in the truest form and manifestation. Those kinds of ethics turn out to one ethics. They are necessarily complementary. Without one, the other cannot be done appropriately. A new integral ethics is then the ethics of authenticity and solidarity.

The synthesis between the ethics of authenticity and that of solidarity is a way to overcome the vulnerability that we possibly find in those ethics. By combining the ethics of the self and that of for others, so to speak, we want to find the best ethical concept. The ethics of authenticity and the ethics of solidarity have to be treated as one integrated ethics. The care for self cannot be taken without considering others and the care for others cannot be given without caring for oneself. The self-care and others-openness have to be undergone in integrated way. To be true to oneself needs others and to be for others needs to be true to oneself. In order to be true to others we need to be true to our own self. Authenticity supposes that the self has good relationship with others and responsibility suggest that the self has self-intimacy. Going out towards others in appropriate way is impossible without going into the depth of oneself.

The ethics of authenticity and solidarity is that of self-fulfillment and social justice ethics. Jesus is the best example of one who does the ethics of authenticity and solidarity. The way of Jesus' speech and deed is based on

self-authority by saying “I”. The manner of his action is self-center that is the characteristic of the ethics of authenticity and the content of the action is always the salvation of others which is actually the characteristic of the ethics of solidarity. He is true to his own self and at the same time he cares totally for others. His life is given for others. Being authentic is somehow a precondition to being just. Jesus is authentic. He cares himself in the sense of being true to himself. At the same time he is social. He cares for other in the sense of being in service for others. The Scripture describes it that early in the morning Jesus by himself goes up to mountain to pray and then he goes down to city or village to do the good things. The good is not his project but his self-realization. He is always moved by compassion to do the good for other. He is not like Zacchaeus whose identity (name) means “pious” but whose activity (act) is “evil”. Jesus whose name means “the Lord is salvation” is doing salvation. His mission and action really indicate his identity; really reveal what is contained in his name, saving people. His identity and his activity are fitting. The ethics of authenticity and solidarity is the ethics of the second commandment. Love your neighbor as you love yourself. In the ethics of authenticity and solidarity, the going outside (solidarity) is the fruit of the good process of the going inside (authenticity); the going outside enriches the going inside.

End Notes:

1. Thomas R. FLYNN, “Authenticity”, in Lawrence C. BECKER (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, Garland, New York – London, 1992, I, 67-69.
2. Edward Sherman gives a good comparative study about Heideggerian and Taylorian authenticity. Edward SHERMAN, “Authenticity and Diversity: A Comparative Reading of Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger”, in *Dialogue* 44 (2005), 145-160. It is believed that Taylor's authenticity is strongly influenced by Heidegger, even though there is a little doubt about that. *Ibid.*, 148.
3. But for Heidegger, “As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being.” Martin HEIDEGGER, *Being and Time*, Harper, San Francisco 1962, 68.
4. For Sartre, authenticity cannot be achieved because the ontological foundation of our relation with others is conflict. Jean-Paul SARTRE, *Being and Nothingness*, Washington Square Press, New York 1992, 19.

5. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989, 27.
6. *Ibid.*, 28.
7. *Ibid.*, 29.
8. *Ibid.*, 30.
9. *Ibid.*, 34. Charles TAYLOR, "Descombes' Critique of Cognitivism", in *Inquiry* 47 (2004) 216.
10. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Self*, *op.cit.*, 46-47.
11. *Ibid.*, 47.
12. *Ibid.*, 48. See also Alasdair MACINTYRE, *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1984, 203-204.
13. Ruth ABBEY, *Charles Taylor*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2000, 39.
14. Charles TAYLOR, *Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers 1*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985, 25.
15. Charles TAYLOR, "Reply to Braybrooke and de Sausa" in *Dialogue* 33 (1994) 126.
16. Charles TAYLOR, "Leading a Life", in Ruth CHANG (ed.), *Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1997, 173.
17. The Good with capital (upper case) is considered as the object of our love or allegiance and the good without capital as something good. Charles TAYLOR, "A Most Peculiar Institution", in J. E. J. ALTHAM – Ross HARRISON (Ed), *World, Mind and Ethics. Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, 135.
18. Charles TAYLOR, "Modern Moral Rationalism", in Santiago ZABALA (ed.), *Weakening Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Gianni Vattimo*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal 2007, 70.
19. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Self*, *op. cit.*, 62.
20. *Ibid.*, 63.
21. *Ibid.*, 97.
22. *Ibid.*, 534.
23. Charles TAYLOR, *Human Agency*, *op.cit.*, 103.
24. *Ibid.*, 97. Taylor's concept of that we have a sense of self is inspired by American psychologist, Erik Erikson. Charles TAYLOR, "Reply to Braybrooke and de Sausa" in *Dialogue* 33 (1994) 127.

25. Ruth ABBEY, *Charles Taylor*, 2000, *op.cit.*, 58-72.
26. Charles TAYLOR, *Human Agency*, *op. cit.*, 75-76.
27. *Ibid.*, 233.
28. Charles TAYLOR, *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994, 32.
29. Charles TAYLOR, *Philosophical Arguments*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1995, 209.
30. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Self*, *op.cit.*, 36.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Charles TAYLOR, *Human Agency*, *op.cit.*, 248.
33. Ruth ABBEY, *Charles Taylor*, 2004, *op.cit.*, 6.
34. Charles TAYLOR, *Philosophical Arguments*, *op.cit.*, 26.
35. Charles TAYLOR, *Multiculturalism*, *op.cit.*, 30.
36. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Self*, *op.cit.*, 112.
37. Charles TAYLOR, *La topografia morale del sé*, Edizioni Ets, Pisa 2004, 80.
38. Charles TAYLOR, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge–London 1992, 1.
39. *Ibid.*, 3.
40. IDavid COCKBURN, “Review of *Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern identity* by Charles Taylor”, in *Philosophical Investigation* 14 (1991) 362.
41. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Sel*, *op. cit.*, 17.
42. Charles TAYLOR, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, *op.cit.*, 5.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, 9. Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, *Democracy in America*, D. Appleton, New York 1901, II, 808. . See Robert T. GANNETT, *Tocqueville Unveiled. The Historian and His Sources for the Old Regime and the Revolution*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992, 6, 35.
45. Charles TAYLOR, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, *op.cit.*, 15.
46. *Ibid.*, 16.
47. *Ibid.*, 23. See also the repetition and further discussion in the book page 73.
48. *Ibid.*, 29.
49. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Self*, *op.cit.*, 159-176.
50. *Ibid.*, 285-302.
51. *Ibid.*, 370.
52. *Ibid.*, 498.
53. Charles TAYLOR, *Sources of the Self*, *op.cit.* 317.

54. Charles TAYLOR, "Justice After Virtue", in John HORTON – Susan MENDUS (ed.), *After MacIntyre. Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1994, 34, 35.
55. About this, some thinkers don't go along with Taylor. See *Ibid.*, 56-57.

Bibliography

1. Abbey, Ruth, *Charles Taylor*, Princeton University Press, Princeton Oxford 2000.
2. _____, (ed.), *Charles Taylor*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004.
3. Cockburn, David, "Review of Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern identity by Charles Taylor", in *Philosophical Investigation* 14 (1991) 360-364.
4. Flynn, Thomas R., "Authenticity", in Lawrence C. BECKER (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, Garland, New York – London 1992, 67-69.
5. Gannett, Robert T., *Tocqueville Unveiled. The Historian and His Sources for the Old Regime and the Revolution*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992.
6. Guignon, Charles, *On Being Authentic*, Routledge, London – New York 2004.
7. Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, Harper, San Francisco 1962.
8. MacIntyre, Alasdair, *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1984.
9. Novak, Michael, "An Authentic Modernity", in *First Things* (1993) [No. 33] 40-42.
10. Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness*, Washington Square Press, New York 1992.
11. Sherman, Edward, "Authenticity and Diversity: A Comparative Reading of Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger", in *Dialogue* 44 (2005) 145-166.
12. Taylor, Charles, *The Explanation of Behaviour*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1964.
13. _____, *Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers 1*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985.

14. _____, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985.
15. _____, *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989.
16. _____, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge – London 1992.
17. _____, *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994.
18. _____, *Philosophical Arguments*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1995.
19. _____, *La topografia morale del sé*, Edizioni Ets, Pisa 2004.
20. _____, “Justice After Virtue”, in John HORTON – Susan MENDUS (ed.), *After MacIntyre. Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1994, 16-43.
21. _____, “Reply to Braybrooke and de Sousa”, in *Dialogue* 34 (1994) 125-131.
22. _____, “A Most Peculiar Institution”, in J. E. J. ALTHAM – Ross HARRISON (ed.), *World, Mind and Ethics. Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, 132-155.
23. _____, “Leading a Life”, in Ruth CHANG (ed.), *Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1997, 170-183.
24. _____, “Descombes' Critique of Cognitivism”, in *Inquiry* 47 (2004) 203-218.
25. _____, “Modern Moral Rationalism”, in Santiago ZABALA (ed.), *Weakening Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Gianni Vattimo*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal 2007, 57-76.
26. Tocqueville, Alexis De, *Democracy in America*, II, D. Appleton, New York 1901.